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Education financing and
student achievement
Giuseppe Bertola and Daniele Checchi
It is widely urged that the great need in schooling is more money to build more fa-
cilities and to pay higher salaries to teachers in order to attract better teachers.
This seems a false diagnosis. ... The problem is not primarily that we are spend-
ing too little money – though we may be – but that we are getting so little per dol-
lar spent. (Friedman, 1995, p. 96).
We briefly review how schools’ financial resources affect the amount, quality, and
heterogeneity of education, and how in turn the provision of educational services be-
ars on students’ achievement. Then, we discuss the implications of different ways of
linking school resources to student achievement, focusing in particular on the distinc-
tion between family-based and State-based channels of financial support.
Introduction
Economists believe that giving appropriate incentives to the relevant agents is
key to ensuring efficiency of their interactions’ outcomes: hence, the argument
in favour of explicitly linking financial incentives to observable schooling out-
comes can be very brief. Following Friedman, (1995), economists often advocate
voucher systems whereby families may reward better schools with more financial
resources, or at least systems of school financing where bureaucratic assessment
programs (rather than families) channel more resources to better-performing
schools and teachers.
From this perspective, it may be puzzling to see that performance-related pay
is not standard in educational systems. In this paper, we review the possible pit-
falls facing reliance on financial incentives in the education field. Economists, of
course, are also aware that interactions can be imperfect when resources and re-
sults (the input and output of education) are imperfectly observable, and that
improving incentives in specific dimensions need not improve the system’s over-
all efficiency when other interactions are left unaddressed and externalities play
Thema
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an important role. Our discussion below is organized along two dimensions.
First, we note that education has both private and public returns, and externali-
ties cannot be ruled out. Hence, the implications of financial allocations based
on the same hypothetically perfect measures of student achievement would in
general differ when families rather than the State bear the cost of education fi-
nancing. Second, we discuss the extent to which the outcomes ultimately rele-
vant to either families or government agencies may in fact be observable.
From this perspective, we review the benefits and possible pitfalls of enhanced
financial responsibility arising from families’ ability to determine schools’ re-
sources – either through participation in a private education market, or through
mobility across locally financed school districts, or through allocation of State-fi-
nanced vouchers or enrolment-based State transfers. Families need not base their
choices on efficient measures of school output when parents do not have access
to the relevant information, and parental choice need not result in efficient so-
cial outcomes when the parents’ objectives fail to internalise relevant externali-
ties.
Then, we review possible pitfalls in State-organized incentives: while the State
could in principle internalise all relevant interactions, bureaucratic decisions
need not be based on relevant indicators, and may be distorted by the role of
teachers in influencing the choice and measurement of indicators. For both fam-
ilies and government agencies, relying on achievement indicators may be more
difficult and less reliable than relying on simple input and process indicators.
We conclude that enhanced emphasis on financial responsibility by school
providers may, but need not improve a schooling system’s performance. Our
brief review of the relevant theoretical mechanisms indicates that the pros and
cons of different financing methods are likely to differ across types and levels of
schooling: family-based channelling of resources is more likely to result in ap-
propriate incentives when returns to education are predominantly private. The-
ory and evidence also suggest that accurate and reliable measures of school per-
formance should play an essential role in any financial incentive scheme, and
that availability of adequate performance measures is in practice very scarce.
Production of education
An individual’s educational outcome can be measured in terms of educational
variables (years of schooling achieved; marks obtained at each level; literacy/nu-
meracy scores; probability of transition to further education), or in terms of
labour market variables (earnings; access to further training; better job quality).
Educational variables determine the individual’s human capital, which depends
in general on the quantity and quality of knowledge achieved.
The inputs to the educational process whose output is human capital include
economic (and financial) resources. A vast literature has studied whether school
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resources are effective in raising educational outputs.1 For our discussion, we will
suppose that additional resources are useful and effective (their marginal pro-
ductivity is positive) and focus on the efficiency of their allocation and use. Pro-
duction of individual human capital, in fact, also depends on key organizational
aspects, such as class and establishment size. And it also depends on the charac-
teristics (talent, and family background) not only of the individual concerned,
but also of his classmates: Benabou (1996) and many other contributions em-
phasize that the extent of school stratification (whether students of similar back-
ground and talent are schooled together) has important implications for educa-
tional outcomes. In theory, school managers can vary not only class size, but also
the quality of students in that schools can sort students according to their ob-
servable abilities, as in the admission to some private schools and/or to most high
schools. Hence, suppliers of education can offer different possibilities of human
capital formation in each class. Since families choose schools according to their
expectations with respect to admission and class formation policies, actual hu-
man capital formation comes out as the equilibrium result of supply and de-
mand for school quality. In what follows we focus on organisational issues, dis-
regarding issues of unobservable characteristics of individuals as well as issues of
resource effectiveness.
At the level of the whole school system, school organization can be read along
three dimensions: comprehensive vs. stratified schools, public vs. private, centrally
financed vs. locally financed. The distinction between comprehensive and strati-
fied educational systems typically emerges at the stage of secondary school: the
former system offers to all students the same type of educational track, typically
based on general competences; typical examples are the English and the North
American school systems. The latter system sorts students according to their in-
tended labour market position, since students (and more frequently their fami-
lies) can choose among vocational training or academic-oriented preparation;
the German system is an archetype of this organisation. While the first dimen-
sion concerns the possibility of market segmentation (in a generalist school sys-
tem all customers obtain the same commodity, whereas in a stratified system cus-
tomers can choose across different goods), the second one has to do with the
amount of resources available. In a public system financed through general taxa-
tion all students receive an identical treatment (i.e. different students obtain the
same amount of resources when they enrol in the same type of school), whereas
in a private system families can choose the preferred amount of resources in-
vested in the education of offspring. As a consequence, the amount of resources
available to students depends on family wealth (i.e. identical students from dif-
ferent families obtain different amount of resources). The third divide partially
overlaps with the second, as long as there are local differences in people prefer-
ences and families are territorially mobile. In a decentralised system schools char-
acterised by high and low levels of spending on students may coexist. If families
are sufficiently mobile, they will «vote with their feet», i.e. they will (optimally)
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choose their residence by maximising the adherence to their preferred spending
(Tiebout, 1956). In addition, local financing of schools, coupled with territorial
mobility, increases school competition for attracting more and better students.
These three dimensions can be combined in alternative ways, also depending
on the schooling levels. A stratified, mainly public and centrally financed educa-
tional system (as in Italy) and a generalist, mixed public-private and locally fi-
nanced educational system (as in the United States) are both possible. Empiri-
cally, it is straightforward to obtain information on the source of financing, but
the other aspects are harder to measure. The following tables provide some ag-
gregate evidence on the fact that private source of funding rises with pre-com-
pulsory and post-compulsory education: in the first case, it pays for either insuf-
ficient public provision (and/or possible amenities like extended timetables,
improved facilities, and so on); in the second case, private return on education
favours the partial transfer of costs onto the final earners of educational benefits.
Table 1: Proportion of public and private expenditure on educational institutions
(1999)
Source: OECD 2003, Education at a glance, Paris, table B4.2
An indirect measure of the degree of homogeneity of education provision can be
obtained by examining the dispersion of students’ achievements in terms of lit-
eracy and numeracy. Table 2 reproduces the decomposition of variation of stu-
dent performance as recorder by the PISA assessment conducted in 2000 under
the supervision of OECD. Many factors contribute to the variation in average
student performance within each country: subnational differences due to differ-
ent jurisdictions, range of the private sector, presence of differentiated curricula
in accordance with past performance, socio-economic intake. The more cen-
tralised is a schooling system, the lower will be the overall dispersion in student
tests; the less stratified and/or the lower the degree of differentiation (due to ei-
ther local financing or access to private education), the lower will be the be-
tween-school variation. From this table we observe the emergence of potential
trade-off: stratified educational systems yield the highest between-school varia-
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pre-primary primary and secondary tertiary education
public private public private public private
France 95.8 4.2 92.8 7.2 84.3 15.7
Germany 62.2 37.8 75.6 24.4 91.5 8.5
Italy 98.7 1.3 98.3 1.7 80.3 19.7
Japan 48.6 51.4 91.8 8.2 44.5 55.5
Switzerland 99.9 0.1 87.7 12.3 96.7 3.3
United Kingdom 95.6 4.4 88.2 11.8 63.2 36.8
United States 90.3 9.7 90.7 9.3 46.9 53.1
OECD average 82.2 17.8 92.1 7.9 79.2 20.8
tion (Italy and Germany)2, but this contributes less to overall dispersion when-
ever the country is centrally financed (Italy, but not Germany). On the other ex-
treme, the more comprehensive is the system, the greater will be the performance
variation within each school, whereas the overall dispersion depends on the
source and the amount of funding.
Table 2: Variance decomposition in literacy ability (PISA 2000)
Source: first three columns: OECD 2003, Education at a glance, Paris, table A7.1; fourth
column: OECD 1996, Education at a glance – OECD Indicators, Paris (country profiles); fifth
column: see table 1.
Note: the first column reports the variance of reading ability scores in the whole sample; the
second column reports the fractions of that variance reflecting different average scores across
schools, and the third reports the variance component due to variability around those average
scores in each school.
These three dimensions (degree of curricula stratification, private share in edu-
cation provision, local financing) overlap with each other and are interrelated, in
that all contribute to segmentation of the «market for education». Standard eco-
nomic theory suggests three points as regards product differentiation:
i) horizontal differentiation (products cannot be ranked in terms of quality, but
are different from the customers’ point of view) and vertical differentiation
(products of higher quality are more costly to produce) have different impli-
cations;
ii) a higher degree of differentiation and segmentation increases the market po-
wer of firms, since each of them is confronted with a stable pool of customers.
iii) in a segmented market, customers are more satisfied (since each customer gets
closer to his preferred bundle of consumption), but consumption inequality
increases.
As regards education, the first point highlights the central issue of information
available to families. Do parents know the quality of available schools? When
Overall
variation
(mean=500)
between-
school
variation (%)
within-
school
variation (%)
secondary
school
system
private sector
in secondary
school
Germany 12.368 56.11 43.89 stratified high
Italy 8.356 56.49 43.51 stratified low
Japan 7.358 46.03 53.97 stratified intermediate
Switzerland 10.408 43.40 56.60 stratified intermediate
United Kingdom 10.098 20.57 79.43 comprehensive intermediate
United States 10.979 44.69 55.31 comprehensive intermediate
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confronting the choice between private or public education, do they take into
account quality considerations, and how and where do they get access to this in-
formation? Market-power considerations are not very relevant when the private
supply of educational services is modest, but can have important pricing impli-
cations when the private sector has a large market share, as in the case of US uni-
versity education.3 Finally, inequality considerations are relevant from a social
point of view: if uniformity of education generates positive externalities, seg-
mentation can be socially suboptimal.
The social role of education
Above, we discussed how combinations of economic and human resources de-
termine the production of human capital, and how the design of the educational
system may provide different degrees of segmentation. When turning to a dis-
cussion of the character of such combinations in reality, and of the efficiency of
the resulting outcomes, it is important to recognize that a given pupil’s education
has effects in a variety of dimensions. Educational achievements bear on the
pupil’s own labour market success, but do not do so in complete isolation, and
important spillovers are theoretically and empirically relevant. On the one hand,
the pupil’s educational achievement can bear on his or her future income
through its relative (to other market participants) characteristics, rather than on
an absolute basis. On the other hand, the average education of the population
can impact social production in much more complex ways than one might ex-
pect by just averaging individual outcomes: one individual’s education can have
positive spillovers on others’ productivity through non-market interactions. Fur-
ther, a degree of uniformity of educational experiences can be beneficial if it fos-
ters easier social and economic interactions (for example, because all citizens
share a language and other modes of communication), and of course society can
also value equality per se. From this perspective, education plays three related
but conceptually distinct socio-economic roles.4
First of all, the school system provides young individuals with essential com-
munication and behavioural skills that will allow them to interact with other
members of society. In primary school, children learn not only how to read and
write, but also to respect each other and obey rules. Such communication and
behavioural skills are essential for the smooth functioning of any organised sys-
tem of social interaction. 5
A second very important role of education is of course that of supplying the
labour market with suitably trained and selected factors of production. Schools
embody in new generations advanced productive skills (human capital), in the
form of an ability to formulate correctly, analyse, and solve problems, and/or of
technical know-how. The former skills are general, and can be learned by exer-
cising and refining one’s ability to reason at an abstract level; the latter skills can
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be learned more mechanically, for specific applications. School systems also se-
lect (screen) members of new generations, and sort them according to their abil-
ity to perform different tasks. The educational curriculum of a student has value
in the labour market if it enhances and certifies general and/or specific skills and
talents. Hence, not only society but also individual students benefits (in the form
of higher wages and/or better employment opportunities) from school curricula
that transmit and certify their usefulness in production.
In order to interpret many features of school systems in market economies,
however, it is important to account for their third important role, namely that of
preserving (or not) the structure of social stratification across generations. The
private value of education is obviously higher when high-quality curricula are
scarce in the labour market and, more generally, in the socio-economic system.
When supplying and certifying skills and talents, schools sort members of new
generations according to their socio-economic duties in society, and the struc-
ture of a schooling system can prevent or foster intergenerational mobility across
different ladders of the social structure.
Efficiency conditions
Economic efficiency is easily defined as a situation where the costs and benefits
are equated on every relevant margin, taking nondivisibilities and increasing re-
turns into account when necessary. Since the production and benefits of educa-
tion both involve many complex and interrelated considerations across individ-
ual decision makers, it not straightforward for either centralized or decentralized
allocation mechanisms to achieve such efficiency. Some of the relevant «produc-
tion factors» (talent, background) are endowed to educational establishments in-
voluntarily by the students themselves, rather than through market transactions,
and some of the benefits of education are public in nature, i.e., they accrue to so-
ciety at large rather than to specific individuals.
Take for example the problem of class formation. From an efficiency point of
view, at least three issues arise when trying to define optimal class formation: se-
lection of students according to their ability, class composition (i.e. mixing stu-
dents of different ability in the same class or creating ability-homogenous
classes), and class size. The first two issues arise whenever students are differently
endowed with abilities that are relevant in educational achievement (attentive-
ness, brightness, cooperation, but also more favourable family background).
Otherwise, only the third one remains relevant. The problem of screening stu-
dents arises from the unobservable nature of individual ability. A large part of
schooling activity is devoted to testing students in order to obtain indirect meas-
ures of these unobservables. Test scores are in turn used as screening devices for
admission to further education. On the whole, one could state that one by-prod-
uct of schooling activity is information about students’ quality.6 This view sup-
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ports the idea of educational certificates as signals for prospective employers: the
longer a student remains in school, the more extensive selection has been passed,
the greater must be her unobservable ability. While testing is the only alternative
in the case of imperfect symmetric information (neither the student, her family
or the teachers know her ability in advance), whenever students and families
have an informational advantage on unobservable ability, admission fees can be
an alternative device to screening students. Suppose one intends to create an élite
school by admitting only the best students, in a context where families have su-
perior information about students’ abilities (imperfect asymmetric information).
All families would like to gain access to the exclusive élite school, because this
will grant higher returns to education in the future, thanks to the better human
capital formation. There are two alternative ways of sorting out the best stu-
dents: either through submitting all applicants to specific exams, or by selecting
them in accordance with their willingness to pay. The main drawback of the al-
location mechanism based on testing is that it wastes resources: students spend
time to prepare for the admission tests, families spend money in order to provide
extra tutoring for the same aim, schools have to pay teachers (or external exam-
ining agencies) to mark exams. In addition, student performance is very often
correlated to family background, and therefore the final result does not always
identify «pure» ability in the students.7 The market mechanism (selecting stu-
dents by means of admission fees, increasing with perceived school quality) is in
principle more efficient: by ordering people according to the maximum fees they
are willing to afford, they indirectly reveal their hidden abilities. Seen from this
perspective, in order to obtain the best students it is sufficient to raise fees ade-
quately. Under the maintained assumption that private schools provide better
quality education, the empirical counterpart is that we should observe better
ability students in private schools, because only for high quality children is ra-
tional to pay more for better education.8
However, the market allocation mechanism works properly only when finan-
cial markets operate perfectly, that is when families can borrow money to afford
high fees on the expectation of high ability children. Otherwise, if markets for
education financing do not exist, poor parents of high ability children will be
outspent by rich parents of lower ability children. Since financial markets for ed-
ucation financing typically either do not exist or are heavily subsidised by the
state, meritocratic selection is in general Pareto-superior as an allocative device in
class formation. Better students could still be prevented from participating in
higher education by high opportunity costs. For this reason, the combination of
meritocratic selection and publicly financed scholarships contingent on family
income can yield the most efficient matching of student to schools.9
But for the sake of discussion, let us assume that we have been able to iden-
tify through whatever mechanism the (unobservable) quality of each student.
The next problem that arises is how to combine in a class students of different
qualities. If learning activity in class is affected by the ability and behaviour of
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classmates, families are not indifferent to the class assignments of their children.
Whenever other people’s features affect one’s current behaviour, we can speak of
peer effect to indicate the externality created by each individual on other people.
Peer effects can take different forms: conformity, competition, envy, and so on.
School classes are a typical example where peer effects reveal themselves. When
peer effects matter, a stratified educational system does not necessarily represent
the most efficient allocation of students. If the peer effect linearly affects the gen-
eration of new human capital (i.e. it enters linearly in the educational produc-
tion function), then exchanging students between schools does not alter the
overall production of human capital.10 In contrast, when the educational pro-
duction function exhibits increasing marginal returns in the peer effect, then
perfect segregation is effectively the most efficient allocation of students. On the
contrary, whenever we observe decreasing marginal productivity of average abil-
ity, then mixing students of different abilities may prove superior in terms of hu-
man capital production.11
A final aspect related to class formation is the problem of optimal class size. If
the educational outcome of a school can be easily identified and priced, then
profit maximisation could identify the optimal class size. The real problem, how-
ever, is that in order to derive optimal size prescription, it is necessary for the ed-
ucational production function to be really affected by class size in empirical data,
but in this respect the empirical evidence is mixed.12
Overall we can summarise this brief review of the problems underlying class
formation by saying that in general:
a) we lack a proper device to reveal unobservable components (either students’
quality or schools’ quality). Market mechanisms based on the availability to
pay may reveal Pareto-inferior;
b) we are aware of externalities (peer effects) but we ignore which is the optimal
class composition because we do not have sufficient information over the
educational production function; as a consequence, we are even unable to
estimate an optimal class size for each order of schooling;
c) there even exists no wide consensus in the literature about which are the true
determinants of educational attainments of students.
In such a context, it is still possible to speak of cost-effectiveness (either in term
of best use of available inputs or in terms of cost-minimising combination of in-
puts). Even though families react to price signals, however, it is not appropriate
to speak of a «market» (or quasi-market) for education, because prices are quite
unlikely to convey the correct set of information to both families and policy
makers.
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Availability of information
Another important, but conceptually distinct difficulty in ensuring efficient oper-
ation of education systems is the scarcity and poor quality of the relevant informa-
tion. As we have seen, even if all characteristics of educational production func-
tions were perfectly known, it would be difficult to devise allocation rules and
prices. But the individual economic benefits of education accrue much later than
the time its costs are paid, are random and hardly verifiable, and depend impor-
tantly on behaviour of the student in the labour market as well as on the quality
(which is generally difficult to ascertain ex ante) of education. Such information
problems generally prevent markets from ensuring that private costs and benefits
are fully accounted for by appropriate intertemporal state-contingent contracts
and – to the extent that not only the form, but also the extent of social effects is
hard to assess – can very well interfere with public allocation mechanisms as well.
Kane and Staiger (2002) offer a review of US experience with school rating,
and of theoretical and statistical pitfalls. They report that State educational sys-
tems increasingly rely on sanctions, and more frequently bonuses, to motivate
schools and teachers. Financial rewards typically can be used for schoolwide ex-
penditures, but in California, North Carolina, and Texas awards directly affect
teachers’ pay. Good performance is assessed at the school level on the basis of
standardized test score increases. It is not surprising, but certainly worrisome, to
see that available indicators of pupil achievement are extremely «noisy», and
therefore unreliable. School-level effects account for only 15% of the overall
cross-sectional variance of individual test scores, and are very volatile on the
yearly scale used to assess performance and award financial resources. Kane and
Staiger sensibly doubt that the small impact of individual schools on their stu-
dents’ performance can motivate their teachers and managers to exert additional
effort in order to reap financial rewards that are determined to a large extent by
luck. Moreover, they list theoretical reasons why awarding financial resources on
the basis of observed performance may actually worsen relevant aspects of school
performance. Good pupil performance can reflect the source population’s back-
ground, and rewarding it can channel resources towards richer local constituen-
cies, with dubious effects on the system’s equity (and, to the extent that educa-
tion is a public good, its efficiency as well): relying on test score improvements
can partially remove this effect, but only at the cost of introducing additional
noisiness. And tests can never assess a child’s overall achievement. In practice,
only simple reading and math skills are tested, and the testing procedures are im-
perfect – both because of coding and statistical errors, and because teachers have
incentives to coach students about the specific skills tested rather than more gen-
eral ones, even within the narrow field of ‘testable’ skills. 13
All this, of course, may diminish, but does not eliminate altogether, the use-
fulness of testing. Standardized tests are clearly only a proxy of labour market-
relevant skills, but it is common for proxies to play a relevant economic role when
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direct performance measures are not available. Academic careers are based on
publications, rather than on direct measures of knowledge, creativity, and dedica-
tion, and airline pilots’ careers depend on fuel consumption and timeliness rather
than on the likelihood of fatal crashes. And standardised test scores appear to be
an empirically relevant proxy: Kane and Staiger report other studies’ measures of
the wage impact of test performance, which appears quite relevant.
Still, it is important to keep in mind that relying on imperfect performance
measures has potential drawbacks, dramatically illustrated by recent accounting
scandals. At Enron, Worldcom, and similar firms, managers were rewarded on
the basis of their ability to beat simple sale or stock-price targets, and had obvi-
ous incentives to manipulate the relevant indicators in the absence of perfect
monitoring. Similarly, one would not want to design a reward system for teach-
ers that would lead them to target performance measures that are both incom-
plete and easily manipulated.
The nature of competition among schools
In previous sections we have listed a series of reasons why it is hard to apply the
traditional paradigm of market efficiency to the analysis of education: imperfect
knowledge of production technology, imperfect observability of students’ qual-
ity, imperfect information on schools quality. Nevertheless we read quite often
pleas to increase school competition as a useful device to improve schools’ effi-
ciency and consequently schools’ quality. A typical way to increase competition
among otherwise identical education providers is to favour their differentiation.
In section 2 we have already discussed alternative strategies to increase school
stratification, along different dimensions (comprehensive vs. stratified curricula,
public vs. private schools, centrally financed vs. locally financed institutions).
We now review the potential consequences of introducing/expanding competi-
tion among schools along one or more of these dimensions.
Generalist vs. stratified
The choice between generalist vs. stratified schools poses the problem of early
tracking. The more stratified is a school system, the more irreversible becomes
the choice of school type. Previous school levels are crucial in sorting students.
The existence of diversified curricula could strengthen the effect of family back-
ground and reduce the degree of social mobility. However this does not seem to
be the case empirically. Table 3 reproduces the estimate of the degree of educa-
tional mobility across generations, as measured from intergenerational transition
matrices computed on the European Household Panel (1994-1997). Countries
with strongly diversified curricula (like Germany and the Netherlands) exhibit
high degree of educational mobility, suggesting that stratification per se does not
contradict the equality of opportunities.
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Table 3: Intergenerational mobility matrices in educational attainment
Source: Comi 2003, table 6 and 7.
Note: Transition matrices are square, and reports the offspring’s probabilities of attaining each
education level conditional on the parent’s attainment. The second-largest eigenvalue of such
matrices is one of the possible measures of intergenerational persistence of educational attain-
ment. The larger is the value of that eigenvalue, the faster is convergence of the distribution of
educational achievements towards its long-run configuration, and the less important is the pa-
rents’ achievement as a determinant of the children’s achievement.
Hannan, Raffe and Smyth (1996) have suggested that the crucial dimension in
shaping the degree of social mobility is not given by curricula differentiation but
by the degree of standardisation within each curriculum. This could explain why
Italy, France or Spain emerge as less mobile despite a lower degree of differentia-
tion. At the other extreme of reduced/absent differentiation, we find the United
Kingdom, which scores quite high in the mobility league. In addition we should
not forget that in general stratified countries have lower educational achieve-
ment.
It is clear that a stratified school system, as in any case of product differentia-
tion, implies a low degree of competition, at least between school types. However
increasing the degree of comprehensiveness of the school system need not be a very
efficient way to foster school competition, because comprehensive schools can re-
main differentiated along public/private, urban/rural, and other dimensions.
Private vs. public
A better strategy to increase competition is the creation (or the expansion) of the
private sector in school provision. The presence of private schools alongside pub-
lic ones can have important implications for the scope and character of educa-
tion. If the cost of private education is borne directly by families, and financial
market imperfections generally constrain poorer families’ educational invest-
ments, then, the customer base of private schools includes only students from
families that are relatively rich and, to the extent that educational achievement
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Country father-son mother-son
Second eigenvalue rank Second eigenvalue rank
Austria 0.045 1 0.044 3
Netherlands 0.061 2 0.000 1
United Kingdom 0.089 3 0.136 7
Germany 0.095 4 0.052 4
Denmark 0.114 5 0.033 2
Greece 0.149 6 0.118 5
Spain 0.160 7 0.168 9
Belgium 0.185 8 0.135 6
Italy 0.210 9 0.167 8
Ireland 0.276 10 0.271 11
Portugal 0.296 11 0.274 12
France 0.298 12 0.224 10
and financial resources are correlated in a market society, are also better edu-
cated. As regards the first, social role of schools, this implies that the children of
«better» families will only learn to interact with each other, not with their poorer
cohorts who remain segregated in cheaper public schools. As regards the other
roles, conversely, private incentives to obtain good schooling may lead to effi-
ciency when oriented to labour market success, but may not coincide with polit-
ical and social goals when oriented to replicate social stratification by emphasiz-
ing the scarcity value of elite education.
A related question is whether the private sector provides better quality educa-
tion. Given the fact that (richer) families are willing to pay a price for schooling
that is otherwise free, one is led to infer that there has to be something valuable
for families. In the 1980s, the extensive «High School and Beyond» survey of-
fered American economic and social researchers rich opportunities to study the
relationship between family background, school curricula, and subsequent
labour market success. A particularly controversial, but robust finding was that a
Catholic appears to be associated with labour market and further education out-
comes that are slightly more favourable on average and, especially, less tightly re-
lated to the students’ background.14 To understand how the relevant effects were
estimated, and to interpret them, it is important to note that in the United States
Catholic schools are not attended only by Catholic students. Many Catholic
schools are located relatively poor urban neighbourhoods, where Irish and Ital-
ian immigrants first settled before moving to the suburbs and leaving the inner
cities to newer and poorer minorities. So, they are attended by a mix of students
with heterogeneous backgrounds, while enrolment in a Catholic school is ceteris
paribus more likely for the children of Catholic families. This makes it possible
for researchers to try to disentangle the effects of schooling from those of back-
ground characteristics, under the identifying assumption that a Catholic back-
ground makes Catholic schooling more likely but does not otherwise influence a
student’s performance in higher education and in the labour market.15
Apart from quality considerations, some parents may elect to send their chil-
dren to private schools because they explicitly support certain values, such as re-
ligion (Sanders, 2001); others because private schools have better facilities, such
as libraries and laboratories, or lower transportation costs. Sometimes the qual-
ity of education or facilities is not even the main issue. Some people consider pri-
vate education a status symbol (Fershtman, Murphy & Weiss, 1996), a way of
improving their own and their children’s social networks, of shielding their chil-
dren from social problems, avoiding contact with immigrants and children with
handicaps, or simply because they do not approve of the open and more hetero-
geneous public school environment (Gradstein & Justman, 2001).
Empirically, it is hard to determine which factors drive parents’ choices. Some
of the variables that might affect parents’ choice are not observable (for instance,
parents’ perception of children’s abilities and how they will perform in the labor
market) or difficult to measure (for instance, intensity of religious belief ). Oth-
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ers are easier to measure, at least in principle. In particular, the quality of educa-
tion should be the main factor if parents consider private education as an invest-
ment good. If instead parents base their decisions on other characteristics, qual-
ity should not be a major concern.
Checchi and Jappelli (2002) study the educational choice of Italian families
with respect to accessing private schools. They find that the quality of public
schools (as subjectively perceived by parents or as measured by provincial indi-
cators of school resources) is an important determinant of the choice between
private and public schools, even controlling for provincial fixed effects. They also
find that private school attendance at the compulsory level is strongly correlated
with parents’ income, while larger family size and, in elementary and lower sec-
ondary schools, the presence of a housewife reduce the probability of private en-
rolment. If we measure school quality from the impact exerted onto subsequent
school performance, the evidence on quality is mixed. Using the university
records of a sample of Italian students, Bertola and Checchi (2001) find that pri-
vate school attendance does not necessarily imply an improvement in educa-
tional careers. Their explanation of this evidence is based on the peculiar self-
sorting mechanisms operating in Italy, where students with heterogeneous talent
and family background characteristics can choose among a wide menu of coex-
istent and overlapping generalist/vocational, public/private, and lay/confessional
schooling options. On average, academic performance is better among students
from public schools. However, private schools (both confessional and lay) im-
prove performance of a subgroup of students whose choice of private school at-
tendance is correlated with family wealth.
Summing up, given the mixed evidence on private school quality, and taking
into account that private school choice is governed by «amenity» considerations
(confessional orientation, status symbol, equipment, and so on), favouring the
expansion of the private sector will definitely improve families’ welfare (because
the enlarged feasible set of choice), but does not necessarily imply improved
competition among schools. Yet beneficial effects on school quality may come
from increased competition from private onto public schools (but this does not
necessarily require a private system, though a more decentralised financing – see
below). When customers pay for services, they are presumably more motivated
to monitor the quality of education received. Hence, competition among
schools (whether private, or publicly funded on the basis of enrolment) can in-
crease efficiency of education supply.
Central vs. local financing
The centrally financed vs. locally financed dimension contains two aspects. Cen-
tralisation can regard the organisation (teachers selection, educational contents)
or may refer to the financing aspect only. A centrally organised system provides
scarce incentives to performance and is typically exposed to teachers’ union pres-
sures;16 nevertheless it ensures homogeneity independently of wealth distribu-
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tion in the population. In a centralised system (where educational contents are
homogeneous across the country, teachers are selected on a national basis, class
standards are identical) the educational degrees have typically a nation-wide
recognition, thus increasing social equality: students from low-income families
(which can reflect a low level of acquired human capital) should have access to
the same level of education as those from a higher income family.17
The second aspect concerns financing. A decentralised system creates
stronger incentives to make more efficient use of resources in order to attract
more students (if the local financing is on a per-student basis) and because of
stronger parental control. Fiske and Ladd (2000) review the large-scale school re-
form undertaken in New Zealand between 1989 (labour government) and 1991
(nationalist government). The state system of compulsory education was fully
decentralised; administrative responsibility was passed to locally elected boards
of trustees; charter schools (combining central funding and accountability with
autonomy of management) were also introduced. Oversubscribed schools had
the right to designate criteria of admission (thus shifting the system from «in-
creased parental choice» to «increased school choice»). According to the evidence
collected by the authors, better-educated parents mainly exploited the increased
availability of choice. Five years after the reform, they noticed an increased po-
larisation of enrolment by ethnic and/or socio-economic groups. They also re-
port an increased polarisation among schools: the most popular schools attracted
most of the students oriented to a university career, better teachers and wealthier
families. A still unsolved question had to do with low performing schools, typi-
cally located in culturally (and economically) deprived areas. The reform left this
issue unsolved, leading the authors to suggest that the new mechanism did not
provide any formal mechanism for balancing the narrow interests of a particular
group of parents against the legitimate needs of broader communities: «The bot-
tom line is that it is impossible to sustain a system in which all parents are com-
pletely free to select the school their child will attend. Some mechanism must be
devised for rationing places in popular schools, and this inevitably involves con-
straints on choice. The challenge is to keep the constraints from falling dispro-
portionately on students from disadvantaged families...».18
The increased variety of experiences allowed for by local financing makes it
more difficult to assess students level and may pose problems in the sequence of
educational levels. While a nation-wide certification cannot survive such a
process of decentralisation, a unified framework is still required, and student
competences have to be assessed by uniform test scores (as in the case of SAT
scores for admission to US universities).
All things considered, decentralisation of funding may be the best strategy to
increase school competition without excessive reliance on families’ wealth (as
when expanding the private sector) and without radical reform of the structure
of the educational system (with respect to alternative tracks).
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Modes of choice and modes of financing
Different market failures are differently relevant for different types of education.
Public-good aspects are most relevant for primary education, whose main pur-
pose is the formation of minimal social skills. At higher levels of education,
schooling offers private benefits, in the form of specialized skills and selective
certification, but also in the form of exclusive status. Hence, one may expect a
decentralized system of private or locally funded schools to foster efficiency. Not
only an explicitly private school market, but also a locally funded system (as long
as families can and do relocate across school-district lines) or a system where
school funding depends on enrolment figures can all let families choose the
school attended by their children, control the quality of the education they re-
ceive, allocate more resources to better-functioning schools, and provide appro-
priate incentives to (or induce exit of ) less efficient providers.
The extent to which enrolment can influence the efficiency of school systems
and improve pupil achievement is, of course, not perfect. Hirschman (1970, p. 16-
17) chose the possibility of school quality control through enrolment mecha-
nisms, advocated by Friedman (1955) as a suitable mechanism, as an example of
the scarce effectiveness of economic «exit» mechanisms in situations with com-
plex, heterogeneous, and uncertain payoffs and interactions. Socio-political
«voice» channels are certainly very active in all schools, whether private or pub-
lic, to the extent that different families care differently about different aspects of
their children’s educational experience. Still, the US evidence indicates that dif-
ferential schooling expenditure does play a role in determining private returns19
and, by extension, that the relevant «exit» mechanisms are at work in that coun-
try fostering private efficiency (if not necessarily social objectives).
However in our opinion the risks associated to an excess of «voice» to families
in the case of school choice are relevant. We have already argued above that mar-
ket failures are more likely when information is imperfect, and that the evidence
of private school quality is blurred by other characteristics (mainly self-selection
of students). Before advocating financial influence of individual-level choices it
is important to consider that the quality of education is not as easy to assess as
that of groceries. Educational inputs (such as the number and qualifications of
teachers, and the size and quality of classrooms) are to some extent observable
and measurable, but educational output depends importantly on the quality of
the student pool attracted. In principle, the quality of an educational experience
should be evaluated on the basis of the students’ labour market experience in the
decades after graduation. In practice, the perceived quality of education is
strongly influenced by a school’s reputation (which changes very slowly, and ef-
fectively prevents new entrants from contesting the incumbents’ market posi-
tion) and by a variety of possibly spurious indicators, such as the pleasantness of
the school’s premises.
Thus, while the social benefits of widening the menu of available choices are
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unclear, the socialising role of education is unambiguously weakened by the ex-
pansion of the private sector. At least at compulsory level, where social external-
ities are presumably higher, private schools limit to the ability of the educational
system to provide all future citizens with a full spectrum of relational abilities.
Targeted school vouchers can nullify the private/public divide, but it still re-
mains true that under imperfect financial markets poorer families cannot finance
long curricula. And even under student aid (compensating for income differ-
ences once a student is enrolled), poorer families may be more risk adverse (if the
coefficient of risk aversion is a function of family income). The idea of a gradu-
ate tax could represent a partial solution: students pay a large part of their in-
vestment only if successful (i.e. after finding a job paying a positive premium
over non graduate workers).20
The alternative strategy is decentralisation, both in funding and in curricula,
while retaining the public source of funding. An increased variety of alternatives
raises competition among schools to attract students, and may be beneficial to
school quality (at least in terms of more effective use of available resources).
However a decentralised educational system is ineffectual in yielding these im-
provements whenever territorial mobility costs are insurmountable. While in the
cases of the UK and the US there is evidence of territorial mobility related to lo-
cal school quality, similar evidence is absent with respect to most European
countries. Even if the efficiency gains do not materialise, there are still good rea-
sons to allow for decentralisation in order to increase families’ freedom of choos-
ing according to their priorities in the education of the offspring.
The most likely consequence of increased variety is the strengthening of
neighbourhood effects, because it increases the homogeneity of cultural milieu
within each school. In a decentralised setting, schools are induced to specialise in
producing a differentiated commodity, and the market for education becomes
segmented. Whether this increases or reduces the average educational achieve-
ment depends on the underlying educational production function.21 The main
problem that we see in this respect is the different degree of information across
families. Parents value education in different ways, presumably in relation with
their own educational experience. Parents who experienced failures at school will
consider education as a risky investment, and are more likely to choose easy
schools for their children.22 At the opposite extreme, educated parents, who ex-
perienced the market value of education, will push their offspring in order to fol-
low their footprints. Thus increased freedom of choice may result in a selection
of talents that is inefficient from a social point of view.23
We believe that even in this respect expected costs in terms of inequality may
exceed the benefits in terms of enlarged opportunities. Our viewpoint is that
there is a body of knowledge that society wants the student to learn, and from
this perspective a school system must be centrally organised and publicly fi-
nanced. However, excessive uniformity dampens the incentives to emerge. Ar-
guably, these incentives should derive from meritocratic stratification of the ed-
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ucational system, where talent, and not wealth, buys access to better schools. The
creation of excellence schools does not reduce either educational or income in-
equality, but has the undeniable advantage of providing an equality of opportu-
nities starting base for anyone.
Concluding remarks
As anticipated in the introduction, the case for private or public achievement-
aware financing is easily made on the basis of obvious incentive mechanisms. But
it is almost as easily criticised on the basis of sometimes less obvious, but perva-
sive, market failures in the education field. Differentiating school financing un-
avoidably tends to introduce differentiation in schooling, which may have ad-
verse implications when externalities would call for a degree of uniformity in
school curricula. And allowing resource allocation to depend on observable out-
comes may similarly damage efficiency if the more relevant pieces of information
are not easily observable by the (private or public) agents in charge of financing.
In summary, financial incentive considerations should not be excluded from
either public or private schooling systems. However, the simplicity and trans-
parency of the overall funding system have important virtues in this field. Exces-
sive reliance on unavoidably imperfect performance-related funding systems can
backfire, to an extent depending on the observability and private character of ed-
ucational outcomes.
Notes
1 See for example the surveys contained in Hanushek, 1996, 2002. Prichett and Filmer
1999 argue that the absence of statistical effect of school resources in estimating educatio-
nal production functions can be attributed the «saturation effects» (i.e. these resources are
used up to the point where the marginal productivity is nil). Carneiro and Heckman 2003
question the idea that family financial resources may prevent school attendance.
2 «In school systems with differentiated school types, the clustering of students with parti-
cular socio-economic characteristics in certain schools is greater than in systems where the
curriculum does not vary significantly between schools. In Austria, Belgium, the Czech
Republic, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands, for example, the between-school variation
associated with the fact that students attend different types of school is considerably com-
pounded by differences in social and family backgrounds» (OECD, 2003, p.82).
3 See Hoxby 1997, where she shows that American universities have incentives to segment
the market for tertiary education, in order to attract the best students, who in turn are the
best input for educational production.
4 See the discussion of this issue in Blöndal, Field and Girouard (2002).
5 «A stable and democratic society is impossible without a minimum degree of literacy and
knowledge on the part of most citizens and without widespread acceptance of some com-
mon set of values. Education can contribute to both. In consequence, the gain from the
education of a child accrues not only to the child to his parents but also to other members
of society» (Friedman, 1955, p. 86.)
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6 Bertola and Coen Pirani 1998 propose a model where schooling is described as a screening
activity (they term it «allocative education»), the precision of which depends on the
amount of invested resources.
7 In addition, the incentive to undergo an exam declines when students do not have an in-
formational advantage on their own ability. Stiglitz 1975 discusses this case, in the context
of a general theory of screening.
8 Fernandez 1998 studies the case of allocating students of different abilities across schools
of different quality. She shows that under perfect capital markets two allocative mecha-
nisms (admission fees and test scores) yield efficient outcomes (in terms of human capital
production). Under borrowing constraints, exams dominate market mechanism in terms
of matching efficiency (allocating better students to better schools).
9 Fernandez and Gali 1999 propose a model where meritocratic selection (in relative terms,
like a tournament) reach matching efficiency, associating better students to better schools
in absence of financial markets. Here the crucial assumption relates to the assumed nega-
tive correlation between unobservable ability and the cost of signalling, thus allowing to
the best students to emerge irrespective of their social origin.
10 This is straightforward, because exchanging a good student for a bad student reduces the
average ability in the good-type school and raises the average ability in the bad-type
school. Given an identical educational production function, the reduced production of
human capital in good schools is matched exactly by the increase in bad schools. (See
Hoxby, 2000.)
11 Continuing the example introduced in the previous footnote, when we exchange students
between high-ability schools and low-ability schools under decreasing marginal producti-
vity of the average ability (peer effect) the human capital loss in the first type of schools is
overcompensated by the gain in the second type of schools.
12 Krueger 1999 analyses the available evidence on the STAR (Student/Teacher Achievement
Ratio) experiment run in Tennessee in the period 1985-89, where 11.600 students in their
first four years of school were randomly assigned to classes of different sizes. He finds that
after controlling for observable characteristics of the student and his/her family back-
ground, «in all grades, the average student in small classes performed better on this sum-
mary [the achieved percentile in the distribution of test scores] than did those in regular
and regular/aide classes». Instead of reviewing a randomised experiment, Woessman and
West 2002 analyse a larger sample from the TIMSS (Third International Mathematics and
Science Study) conducted during the academic year 1994-95 by IEA (International Asso-
ciation for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement) across 40 countries. They find evi-
dence of a negative effect of class size on 13-year old students in 4 cases out of 36 cases,
leading to the conclusion that «in the vast majority of cases, however, the estimated coef-
ficient is not statistically significantly different from zero».
13 Kane and Staiger report an arresting example whereby the format – horizontal rather than
vertical – of math exercises was enough to alter test scores dramatically, and the students’
subtraction skills were markedly lower than the addition skills they expected to be tested
on.
14 See e.g. Altonji, Elder and Taber, 2000; Coleman, Hoffer, and Kilgore, 1982; Evans and
Schwab, 1995; Neal, 1997.
15 In the United States, public education is locally funded, hence its quality is far from uni-
form, and it is not surprising to find that private schools offer better education. It is har-
der however to understand why attendance of Catholic schools should not only benefit
American students on average (in terms of better opportunities for and better performance
in higher education, and labour market outcomes), but also be especially beneficial for stu-
dents from disadvantaged backgrounds. It has been suggested that a student culture based
on self-discipline, on the notion that «No one fails who works hard,» and on the feeling of
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belonging to a voluntary community may be an important asset for primary and secon-
dary Catholic educational establishments. There is also some evidence that the teachers
employed by Catholic schools are better monitored and more highly motivated than their
colleagues who work – for significantly higher wages – in public schools (see Bryk et al.
1993 for a recent review of this literature)
16 Hoxby 1996 finds that unionisation of teachers can account for greater use of educational
inputs; this evidence is consistent with either teachers having better information about
educational production function (efficiency-enhancing) or with teachers’ unions being rent
seekers. In addition to educational budget expansion, teachers’ unions may also be able to
change budget allocation in favour of inputs that reduce teachers’ effort (like reducing
class size and/or teaching load per teacher) or increase teachers’ salaries.
17 Checchi, Ichino and Rustichini 1999 compare the centralised nature of the Italian educa-
tional system with the largely decentralised nature of the US system, under the theoretical
expectation of a more compressed distribution of human capital investments (and there-
fore of incomes) matched by a higher likelihood of upward mobility for poor families in
the more centralised country. They find evidence of the former but not of the latter pro-
position.
18 Fiske and Ladd 2000, p.287.
19 As reflected e.g. by housing values; see Barrow & Rouse, 2002.
20 «A governmental body could offer to finance or help finance the training of any individual
who could meet minimum quality standards. [...] The individual in return would agree to
pay to the government in any future year a specified percentage of his earnings in excess of
a specified sum for each $1000 that he received from the government. [...] The base sum
should be set equal to the estimated average earnings without the specialized training; the
fraction of earnings paid should be calculated so as to make the whole project self-finan-
cing. [...] the free choice of individuals would tend to produce the optimum amount of in-
vestment.» (Friedman 1955, p. 106.) See the empirical application of similar ideas in Aus-
tralia, as reported by Chapman, 1997.
21 Whether student abilities are complements or substitutes in the educational production
function, (see Benabou 1996).
22 Piketty 1995 presents a similar model where the attitude towards fiscal redistribution de-
pends on past experience of social mobility: individuals who experienced low mobility
vote for more redistribution, whereas individuals with an experience of higher mobility
will expect it to last in the future and will oppose redistribution on the expectation of be-
coming richer.
23 There is a wide debate on what can be defined as social efficiency. See for example the fol-
lowing quote by Pareto:
Dans les sociétés modernes, les éléments de la stabilité sont donnés par la propriété privée et l’hé-
rédité; les éléments de la mutabilité et de la sélection viennent de la faculté donnée à tous de
monter autant que faire se peut dans la hiérarchie sociale.... Si on pouvait d’une façon efficace
supprimer quelque espèce de propriété privée, par exemple celle des capitaux, et, en partie ou en
totalité, l’hérédité, on affaiblirait beaucoup l’élément de stabilité, et on renforcerait l’élément de
mutabilité et de sélection. On ne peut pas décider a priori si cela serait utile ou nuisible à la so-
ciété. (Pareto, 1966, p. 426-427).
From a different ideological perspective, Marx was well aware of the same concept of so-
cial stability: «Although the circumstances continually bring an unwelcome number of
new soldiers of fortune into the field and into competition with the already existing indi-
vidual capitalists, it also reinforces the supremacy of capital itself, expands its base, and en-
ables it to recruit ever new forces for itself out of the substratum of society ... The more a
ruling class is able to assimilate the foremost minds of a ruled-class, the more stable and
dangerous becomes its rule» (Marx, Capital, vol. III – quoted in Goldthorpe, 1980, p. 5).
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Bildungsfinanzierung und Ausbildungserfolg
Zusammenfassung
Der vorliegende Beitrag gibt zunächst einen kurzen Überblick darüber, wie sich
finanzielle Ressourcen auf die Menge, die Qualität und die Heterogenität von
Bildungsangeboten auswirken und dadurch den Ausbildungserfolg beeinflussen.
Anschliessend werden die Effekte unterschiedlicher Möglichkeiten, mit dem
Einsatz finanzieller Ressourcen den Ausbildungserfolg zu beinflussen, diskutiert.
Speziell wird der Unterschied zwischen familienbasierter und staatlicher finan-
zieller Unterstützung fokussiert.
Financement de l'éducation et réussite des élèves
Résumé
Dans cet article, nous passons brièvement en revue les modalités selon lesquelles
les ressources financières des écoles affectent la quantité, la qualité et l’hétérogé-
néité de l’offre éducative. Nous examinons ensuite l’influence de celle-ci sur les
résultats des élèves. Enfin, nous discutons des effets exercés par les différentes
manières de mettre en relation les ressources des écoles sur les résultats des élèves,
en nous intéressant particulièrement à la distinction entre le financement par la
famille et le financement par l’État.
Finanziamento dell'educazione e risultati degli studenti
Riassunto
In questo lavoro offriamo una breve rassegna di come le risorse finanziarie
influenzino la quantità, qualità, ed eterogeneità dei servizi educativi
scolastici, e di come tali servizi a loro volta influenzino i risultati
ottenuti dagli studenti. Procediamo quindi a discutere vari possibili
meccanismi di collegamento tra risorse scolastiche e risultati educativi,
studiando in particolare le differenze tra canali di finanziamento basati su
decisioni familiari e su scelte collettive.
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